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use by customers" has apparently not limited the application
of the provision to a significant degree.  The rental of land
has satisfied that requirement.17
Self-developed rental property
Net rental income from self-developed rental property may
be recharacterized as nonpassive income if the property is
sold within 24 months after first being used as rental property
and the taxpayer materially or significantly participated for
any year in enhancing the property value.18
Sale of "substantially appreciated" property
Gains from the sale of "substantially appreciated" property
used in a passive activity may be recharacterized as income
from a nonpassive activity unless the property was used for
either—(1) 20 percent of the period during which the
taxpayer held an interest in the property or (2) the entire 24-
month period ending on the date of the disposition.19
"Substantially appreciated" property is defined as property
whose fair market value exceeds 120 percent of its adjusted
income tax basis.20
"Significant participation" activities
The regulations recharacterize the net income from a
"significant participation activity" (SPA) as not from a
passive activity.21  A SPA is a trade or business in which the
taxpayer participates for more than 100 hours in an activity
during the taxable year but fails to reach the 500 hour level
which is required for material participation.22  The rule is an
aggregate concept for individuals who devote more than 500
hours spread over several activities and meet the 100 hour
test for each separate activity.23  The idea is to treat
individuals with several activities as favorably as someone
who devotes an equivalent amount of time to a single
activity.
If the taxpayer's aggregate SPAs do not constitute activities
in which the taxpayer materially participates (the 500 hour
test is not met), an amount of the taxpayer's gross income
from each SPA equal to the taxpayer's net income from the
SPA may be recharacterized as income from a nonpassive
activity.24
In conclusion
Planning to assure deductibility of passive activity losses is
a challenge.  The income recharacterization rules have added
another complicating dimension to the problem.  Thus far, the
courts have upheld the regulations and have generally
supported the IRS interpretation of the rules.
FOOTNOTES
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16 Kelly v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 2000-32.
17 Wiseman v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1995-203.
18 Treas. Reg. § 1.469-2(f)(5).
19 Treas. Reg. § 1.469-2(c)(2)(iii).
20 Treas. Reg. § 1.469-2(c)(2)(iii)(C).
21 Treas. Reg. § 1.469-2(f)(2).
22 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.469-2(f)(2)(ii), 1.469-5T(c).
23 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(a)(4).  See Speer v.
Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1996-323 (taxpayer failed to meet
burden of proof that test met; "ballpark guesstimate"
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24 Treas. Reg. § 1.469-2(f)(ii).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
PAYMENT OF TAXES. The parties’ properties were
originally deeded erroneously by a previous owner such
that both parties had title to an 11 acre parcel of land. The
defendant’s title was created first in 1944, however, the
plaintiff had paid the taxes on the disputed property from
1958 through 1994. The disputed property was unimproved
and unfenced until 1996 when the defendant fenced in the
disputed tract. The evidence also showed that the tax
assessor had alerted the parties’ predecessor in interest
about the title problem in 1980. Under Ark. Code § 18-11-
102, the payment of taxes for seven consecutive years on
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unimproved and unenclosed land under color of title was
sufficient to be deemed possession of the land for the years
the taxes are paid. The court held that (1) the plaintiff had
sufficient color of title, (2) the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s
predecessors in interest had paid the taxes on the land for
more than seven years, and (3) the land was unimproved
and unenclosed during the years the taxes were paid. The
court held that the plaintiff had acquired the land by
adverse possession for over seven years. Jones v. Barger, 1
S.W.3d 31 (Ark. Ct. App. 1999).
ANIMALS
LIVESTOCK ON HIGHWAY. The plaintiff was
injured while stopped on a public highway behind a flock
of sheep owned by the defendants. The defendants were
moving the sheep from one pasture to another and were on
the highway for about three-fourths of a mile. The
defendants had a vehicle with flashing lights in front of the
sheep and behind the sheep. A third party failed to stop and
hit the plaintiff’s vehicle from behind. The defendants
argued that Idaho Code § 25-2119 provided absolute
immunity from liability from negligence. The statute
provided immunity so long as the sheep were lawfully on
the highway. The issue was certified to the Idaho Supreme
Court with the finding that the sheep were lawfully on the
highway at the time of the accident. The issue was the
effect of the immunity. The defendant argued that the
statute provided immunity from all negligence claims,
whereas the plaintiff argued that the statute only eliminated
the res ipsa loquitur inference of negligence which arose
when animals are involved in an accident on a highway. In
examining the historical development of liability for
animal-related accidents on highways, the court noted that
no case involving res ipsa loquitur had occurred prior to
enactment of the statute; therefore, the court reasoned that
the statute was not intended to apply only to res ipsa
liability. The court held that the statute provided complete
immunity to an animal owner for accidents resulting from
the owner’s animals lawfully on a public highway.
Adamson v. Blanchard, 990 P.2d 1213 (Idaho 1999).
BANKRUPTCY
GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
DISCLAIMER . The debtor received an inheritance and
disclaimed the inheritance before filing for Chapter 7. The
trustee sought to recover the disclaimed inheritance as a
preferential transfer. The court held that, because the
disclaimer had the effect of relating back to erase the
inheritance, the disclaimer was not a transfer of estate
property subject to the preferential transfer rules. In re
Bright, 241 B.R. 664 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1999).
FEDERAL TAX     -ALM § 13.03[7].*
AUTOMATIC STAY . The debtor had filed a suit with
the Tax Court and sought relief from the automatic stay to
continue the case. The court held that the automatic stay
provisions do not apply to lawsuits brought by the debtor
and th t no relief was necessary. In re Thompson, 241
B.R. 920 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1999).
Prior to filing for Chapter 7, the debtor entered into an
offer of compromise with the IRS which provided for an
immediate partial payment and the debtor’s agreement to
apply all future overpayments to the tax deficiency. After
the petition, the debtor sought to apply the 1997
overpayment to 1998 estimated taxes. The IRS, however,
applied the overpayment to the past tax deficiency. The
trustee sought return of the overpayment because the IRS
had not asked for setoff approval, the overpayment and past
taxes had no mutuality and the post-petition setoff violated
the automatic stay. The court held that the setoff did violate
the automatic stay but also held that, because the
overpayment was subject to setoff once the IRS properly
applies for the setoff, the overpayment did not need to be
return d. In re Schield, 242 B.R. 1 (Bankr. C.D. Calif.
1999).
POST-PETITION TAXES . The debtor filed for Chapter
11 on October 24, 1995 and did not make the election to
end the debtor’s tax year on the date of the petition. The
debtor’s plan included claims for federal income taxes for
several years, including 1995, and was confirmed without
objection from the IRS. After the plan was confirmed, the
IRS attempted to assess and collect the 1995 taxes. The
debtor argued that the confirmed plan was res judicata as to
the 1995 taxes. The court held that the 1995 taxes were
clearly post-petition taxes and not part of the bankruptcy
estate liability. In addition, because the taxes were not part
of the bankruptcy case, the Anti-Injunction Act prohibited
the Bankruptcy Court from modifying the collection of the
taxes by the IRS. Therefore, the court held that the IRS was
entitled to collect the taxes outside of the plan provisions.
In re Wood, 240 B.R. 609 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
PREFERENTIAL TRANSFERS . The debtor had made
a ubst ntial payment to the IRS just before filing for
Chapter 7. The trustee sought to avoid the payment as a
preferential transfer, arguing that the IRS received more
t an it would post-petition because substantial
administrative expenses from attorney’s fees would
diminish the share of the estate payable to the IRS. The
Bankruptcy Court held that the determination of whether
the IRS received more than it would have post-petition was
to be made at the time of the Chapter 7 filing; therefore, the
payment to the IRS was not preferential, since, at the time
of the Chapter 7 filing, the IRS would receive more from
the estate than it received in the pre-petition payment. The
District court reversed, holding that the Bankruptcy Court
should have determined the reasonable trustee and
attorney’s fees which would have a priority as an
administrative claim and then determine whether the
remainder of the estate was greater than the amount paid to
the IRS pre-petition. If the value of the estate, after
subtracting the trustee and attorney administrative claims,
was less than the payment made to the IRS, the payment
was a voidable preference. The case was remanded for a
determination of the reasonable trustee and attorney fees. In
re Lutz, 241 B.R. 172 (E.D. Mich. 1997), rev’g and
rem’g, 212 B.R. 846 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1997).
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FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
ADVERTISING ASSESSMENTS. The plaintiff was a
mushroom grower assessed funds for the advertising of
mushrooms as required under the Mushroom Promotion,
Research and Consumer Information Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6101
et seq. The plaintiff argued that the assessment violated the
First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution in that it required
the plaintiff to participate in the advertisements which the
plaintiff saw as against the plaintiff’s interest. The court
interpreted Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521
U.S. 457 (1997) as upholding the constitutionality of
advertising assessments only where the industry was
completely regulated as was the fruit tree industry in
Wileman. Because the mushroom industry was not
completely regulated, the assessments for compelled
commercial speech violated the plaintiff’s First
Amendment right to not participate in the commercial
speech in the advertisements. United Foods, Inc. v. United
States, 197 F.3d 221 (6th Cir. 1999).
FARM PROGRAMS . The FSA and CCC have adopted
as final regulations which implement the crop and market
loss provisions of the Agriculture, Rural Development,
Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act of 2000 and the Omnibus Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2000. The regulations also
implement the statutory provisions related to the 1999 Crop
Disaster Program, the Livestock Assistance and Livestock
Indemnity Programs, Market Loss Assistance Programs for
Dairy, Peanuts, and Tobacco, the Milk Price Support
Program, Recourse Loan Programs for Mohair and Honey,
advance production flexibility contract payments, revision
of the Upland Cotton User Marketing Certificate Program,
postponement of the Dairy Recourse Loan Program and
elimination of the enforcement of sugar marketing
assessments through FY 2001. 64 Fed. Reg. 7941 (Feb. 16,
2000).
FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAX
INSTALLMENT PAYMENT OF ESTATE TAX . The
decedent had owned land through a grantor trust. The trust
also owned all of the stock of the decedent’s wholly-owned
corporation. The land was used by the decedent’s
corporation in the corporation’s business. The decedent was
actively involved in the daily business of the corporation
and also hired managers and directed all the employees.
The IRS ruled that the value of the land, building and other
business assets were included in the decedent’s trade or
business for purposes of determining the percentage of the
value of the estate which was an interest in a closely held
business. The business was included as a corporation and
the land as a sole proprietorship. The Digest will publish an
article by Neil Harl on this ruling. Ltr. Rul. 200006034,
Nov. 12, 1999.
VALUATION . The decedent’s estate included a 25
percent interest in a limited partnership which owned an
apartment building. The other partnership interests were
held by family members. The IRS agreed that the interest
was entitled to a discount for lack of marketability and for a
minority interest. The estate claimed a 62 percent combined
discount but the IRS claimed a 32 percent discount. The
court held that a discount of 53 percent was to be applied
for lack of marketability and 20 percent for the minority
interest. Estate of Weinberg v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
2000-51.
The decedent owned three commercial rental properties as
tenant in common with a trust established by the decedent’s
predeceased spouse for the decedent. The court allowed a
25 percent discount for lack of marketability of the
decedent’s interests in all three properties. Estat  of
Stevens v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2000-53.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
BAD DEBTS. The taxpayer loaned money to a
corporation in which the taxpayer was a shareholder. The
taxpayer sought to deduct the loans as business bad debts,
arguing that the taxpayer was in the business of promoting
corporations. The court held that the loans were in the
nature of investments in the corporation and were not
eligible for business bad debt treatment. Chamberlin v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2000-50.
CASUALTY LOSSES. The taxpayers owned a residence
which they put up for sale in October 1993. The taxpayers
started extensive repairs and remodeling to enhance the sale
and had some furniture in the property when it was
damaged by an earthquake in January 1994. The property
was rented four days later and the taxpayers claimed a
business casualty loss for actual damage and loss of value.
The court held that the taxpayers had not converted the
residence to a business use prior to the earthquake and that
the casualty losses were personal losses subject to the
personal loss limitations of I.R.C. § 165(h). Palos v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2000-56.
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS. The
plaintiff was a state patrol officer who had brought a suit
under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act to recover
wages for overtime work. The suit argued that the plaintiff
was not exempt from the overtime requirements and was
entitled to back pay for the overtime worked. The parties
reach d a settlement and the plaintiff signed a release of all
claims, including any claims for personal injuries. The
court held, however, that the settlement payments were
made entirely for the overtime back pay claims; therefore,
the court held that the settlement payments were all
included in the plaintiff’s income. Jacobs v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 2000-59.
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EMPLOYEE BENEFITS. The taxpayer was a
partnership which provided a self-funded health insurance
plan for its partners and employees. The plan provided that
the premiums were based on the actual claims against the
plan, with some deficits covered by the partnership.
Premiums were also determined by the type of coverage
sought by each participant. The IRS ruled that (1) the plan
was “an arrangement having the effect of accident or health
insurance" as that phrase is used in I.R.C. § 104(a)(3); (2)
payments from the plan made to or for the benefit of
partners for themselves and their dependents will be
excludable from the partners' income under I.R.C. §
104(a)(3); and (3) the premium payments made by
individual partners for coverage under the self-funded plan
would be deductible by them under I.R.C. § 162(I). Ltr.
Rul. 200007025, Nov. 19, 1999.
EXPENSE METHOD DEPRECIATION . The taxpayer
was a partner in an LLC which started a new business. The
LLC was taxed as a partnership and had a net loss for the
first tax year. In addition to the loss, the LLC claimed
$17,000 in expense method depreciation deduction for new
equipment. The taxpayer claimed a share of the net loss and
expense method depreciation on the taxpayer’s personal
income tax return. The court held that the eligibility for the
expense method depreciation deduction had to be
determined at the partnership level. Because the partnership
did not have any taxable income, no expense method
depreciation deduction could be taken. The taxpayer argued
that the regulation involved, Treas. Reg. § 1.179-2(c)(2),
was invalid. The taxpayer contended that, since for
purposes of the I.R.C. § 179(b)(3)(A) limitation, the
taxpayer could aggregate taxable incomes from different
trades or businesses, the taxpayer should be able to
aggregate the taxpayer’s taxable income with the income of
the partnership under I.R.C. § 179(d)(8) to determine the
partnership's taxable income. The taxpayer also argued that
I.R.C. § 179(b)(3)(A) applied only to the taxable income of
the taxpayer derived from the trade or business by the
taxpayer. The taxpayer contended that, under I.R.C. § 701,
a partnership is not a taxpayer; therefore, that section
cannot apply to a partnership. The taxable income
limitation in I.R.C. § 179(b)(3)(A) was, therefore,
meaningless when applied to a partnership, and Treas. Reg.
§ 1.179-2(c)(2) was accordingly invalid. The court noted
that a partnership is often considered a taxpayer under the
I.R.C. and held that the regulation was valid. Hayden v.
Comm’r, 2000-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,219 (7th Cir.
2000), aff’g, 112 T.C. No. 11 (1999).
GROSS INCOME . The IRS has announced its
acquiescence in the result of the following case. The
taxpayers sold a business property under a sales agreement
which provided for escrow of initial payments and the title
to the property until the closing of the sale. The amounts
paid into the escrow by the buyer were immediately
transferred to the taxpayers who made personal use of the
funds. The sales agreement provided for the return of the
deposit funds if the sale failed to close due to the taxpayers’
fault. The escrow agreement was extended into the next tax
year and eventually fell through when the taxpayers could
not supply clear title to the property. The taxpayers had to
repay almost all of the deposits. The IRS argued that the
deposits were to be included in the taxpayers’ gross income
when dis ributed to them because the taxpayers had a claim
of righ  to the funds. The court held that the distribution
was made only under a contingent claim and that the
taxpayers always were liable for repayment until the sale
closed. Therefore, the court held that the deposits were not
included in the taxpayers’ income in the year received.
Ahadpour v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1999-9, acq. AOD
2000 FED (CCH) ¶ 46,283..
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
DEFINITION. The decedent and two children and the
members of another family created a limited partnership.
Each member contributed an interest in a ranch and the
decedent also contributed $1 million in securities. Each
member received an interest in the partnership in
accordance with the value of the property contributed. The
general partner was not formed until after the decedent’s
death. The court found that the purpose of the partnership
formation was to centralize management and to preserve the
ranch as a family business. The IRS argued that the
partnership was formed solely for the purposes of reducing
the value of the decedent’s estate. The decedent had been
diagnosed with breast cancer but died from another illness.
The decedent had contributed $1.5 million in property and
securities but the limited partnership interest received had a
fair market value of $617,591. The court held that the
partnership was valid. Church v. United States, 2000-1
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 60,369 (W.D. Tex. 2000).
PASSIVE LOSSES. The taxpayer was employed as a
mechanical engineer for a real estate development
company. The taxpayer also owned two rental properties
and spent more than 750 hours per year performing
aintenance on the properties. The properties had net
losses and the IRS disallowed the losses above the passive
loss limit. The taxpayer argued that the tax treatment of 5
percent or more owners, allowing deduction of the losses,
and non-owners of real estate businesses, denying the
deducti , was unconstitutional. The court held that the
distinction had a rational purpose in order to prevent the tax
shelter possibilities, except in the case of real estate
businesses. Pungot v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2000-60.
PENSION PLANS. The IRS has issued a revenue
procedure which provides for a waiver of the 100 percent
tax imposed under I.R.C. § 4971(b) on an employer who
maintains a pension plan for which there is an accumulated
funding deficiency under I.R.C. § 412. The waiver is
applicable if (1) the plan is subject to Title IV of ERISA
and is terminated in a standard termination under section
4041 of ERISA; (2) plan participants are not entitled to any
portion of residual assets remaining after all liabilities of
the plan to participants and their beneficiaries have been
satisfied; (3) excise taxes that have been or could be
imposed under I.R.C. § 4971(a) have been paid for all
taxable years, including the taxable year related to the year
of lan termination; and  (4) all applicable forms in the
5500 series, including Schedule B (Actuarial Information),
have been filed for the plan for all plan years including the
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year of plan termination. Rev. Proc. 2000-17, I.R.B. 2000-
__.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS. Certiorari has been
sought for the following case. The taxpayer was a
shareholder in an S corporation which was a partner in a
joint venture which realized discharge of indebtedness
income in 1991. The taxpayer increased the basis of the
taxpayer’s S corporation stock by the taxpayer’s share of
the discharge of indebtedness income passed through the S
corporation. At the time of the discharge of the
indebtedness, the S corporation was insolvent and had net
operating losses. The increase in the stock basis enabled the
taxpayer to deduct the carried-over losses in a later year.
The IRS argued that the discharge of indebtedness income
was not an item of income for purposes of determining
stock basis because discharge of indebtedness income was
excluded under the insolvency exclusion rule of I.R.C. §
108. The Tax Court held that, because the corporation was
insolvent, I.R.C. § 108 caused an exclusion of the discharge
of indebtedness income at the corporation level which was
offset by reduction in tax attributes of the corporation,
leaving no tax consequences to flow to the shareholders
such as would increase the shareholders’ basis in stock.
Gitlitz v. United States, 99-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,645 (10th Cir. 1999), aff’g sub nom., Winn v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1998-71, withdrawing T.C. Memo.
1997-286; Nelson v. Comm’r, 99-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
¶ 50,646 (10th Cir. 1999), aff’g, 110 T.C. 114 (1998).
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
March 2000
AnnualSemi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 6.45 6.35 6.30 6.27
110 percent AFR 7.11 6.99 6.93 6.89
120 percent AFR 7.77 7.62 7.55 7.50
Mid-term
AFR 6.80 6.69 6.63 6.60
110 percent AFR 7.50 7.36 7.29 7.25
120 percent AFR 8.19 8.03 7.95 7.90
Long-term
AFR 6.75 6.64 6.59 6.55
110 percent AFR 7.43 7.30 7.23 7.19
120 percent AFR 8.13 7.97 7.89 7.84
Rev. Rul. 2000-11, I.R.B. 2000-__.
TRAVEL EXPENSES. The taxpayer operated a delivery
business and paid its drivers 40 percent of the delivery
charge. A portion of the payment was straight wages, with
the remainder allocated to reimbursement for car and other
expenses. The drivers provided monthly statements of
actual miles and expenses but the reimbursement amount
did not equal the mileage rate and expenses reported. The
difference occurred because the drivers could include more
than one delivery in a single trip. The court held that the
entire payment was wages subject to withholding because
the reimbursement was not based on actual mileage or
expenses and the taxpayer did not require the employees to
return any reimbursement above the actual mileage rate or
expenses reported. Shotgun Delivery. Inc. v. United
States, 2000-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,210 (N.D. Calif.
2000).
WITHHOLDING TAXES .  The taxpayer was a
restaurant which collected the tips received by its waitstaff.
However, the staff underreported its tip income and the IRS
sought payment from the taxpayer of FICA taxes on the
total unreported tip income. The IRS used the aggregate
method of determining the underreported tip income instead
of determining the amount of underreported tip income for
each employee. The taxpayer argued that the aggregate
method was not authorized by the FICA statute. The court
held that the aggregate method was allowed by the statutory
authority of the IRS to issue regulations to carryout the
statute. West Hubbard Restaurant Corp. v. United
States, 2000-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,225 (7th Cir.
2000), aff’g, 99-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,107 (N.D.
Ill. 1999).
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
COMBINE. The plaintiff purchased a combine
manufactured by the defendant. The engine in the combine
caught fire and destroyed the combine and unharvested
wheat. The general rule in Kansas, under Koss Construction
v. Caterpillar, Inc., 960 P.2d 255 (1998), is that a purchaser
of defective goods cannot sue in tort for damages to the
goods caused by the defect. The plaintiff argued that,
because the engine, manufactured by another defendant,
was not part of the combine, the damages were to other
goods, allowing a suit in tort for those damages. The court
rejected this argument, holding that the engine was a
component part of the combine. The plaintiff also argued
that the Koss rule did not apply to a consumer transaction.
Although the court acknowledged that Koss involved a
transaction between merchants, the court held that the Koss
rule also applied to consumer transactions. There is no
mention of the issue of whether the plaintiff was considered
a merchant. Jordan v. Case Corp., No 82,216 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1999).
PESTICIDES. The plaintiff had used a herbicide
manufactured by the defendant. The herbicide label and the
selling representative had claimed that the herbicide could
be applied to soybeans in one year and would not carry over
to a corn crop in the following year. The plaintiff claimed
that the herbicide did carry over and caused damage to the
plaintiff’s corn crops. The plaintiff brought a suit under
several theories but only two remained for this case, breach
of implied warranty of merchantability and negligent design
and testing. The court held that the breach of implied
warranty of merchantability claim was preempted by
FIFRA because the claim applied only to claims made on
the lab l. The court held, however, that the negligence
design and testing claim was not preempted because the
claim did not affect any information on the label.
Ackerman v. American Cyanamid Co., 586 N.W.2d 208
(Iow  1998).
The plaintiffs had used an insecticide manufactured by the
defendant. The plaintiffs claimed that the pesticide caused
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birth defects in their grandchild and filed a suit under
theories of negligence, products liability, and breach of
warranty. Most of the claims involved the failure of the
defendant to warn that the insecticide could cause birth
defects; therefore, the court held that those claims were
preempted by FIFRA. However, the court held that the
defective manufacturing and design claims were not
preempted by FIFRA. Those claims however, were
dismissed by summary judgment because the plaintiffs had
failed to provide any evidence of causation between the
defective insecticide and the birth defects. National Bank
of Commerce v. Dow Chemical Co., 165 F.3d 602 (8th
Cir. 1999).
The plaintiffs were grain farmers and had applied to their
fields a herbicide manufactured by the defendant. The
plaintiffs claimed that the herbicide damaged the corn crops
and sued in strict liability, breach of express and implied
warranties, negligent formulation, and negligent testing.
The plaintiffs sought damages for the loss of the crop. The
court held that economic losses were not recoverable in tort
under the strict liability and negligence claims. The court
also held that consequential damages were not recoverable
under the warranty claims because there was no privity of
contract between the plaintiffs and defendant, since the
plaintiff did not buy the herbicide directly from the
defendant. Frielein v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 58
F. Supp.3d 1061 (N.D. Iowa 1999).
STATE REGULATION OF
AGRICULTURE
PACKERS. Since 1949, under N.D.C.C. §§ 36-09-18,
36-22-03, 36-22-08, the North Dakota Stockmen’s
Association (NDSA) has been responsible for administering
the livestock branding, recording and inspection program in
North Dakota. The NDSA was authorized to charge a fee
for the services which was paid directly to the NDSA. The
plaintiffs were cattle owners who had registered livestock
brands through the NDSA and they challenged the program
as unconstitutional because the fees were not paid to the
state treasury subject to appropriation by the legislature.
The statute provided for a continuing appropriation of the
fees directly to the NDSA. The NDSA first argued that the
plaintiffs did not have standing because the suit was
brought only to seek revenge against the NDSA for
terminating the plaintiffs’ employment. The court held that
the motive for a suit had no effect on the standing of the
plaintiffs who were clearly subject to the statutes. The
NDSA then argued that it was not an agent of the state;
therefore, the fees were not public moneys required to be
paid to the state treasury by N.D. Const. Art. X, § 12. The
court noted that (1) the NDSA had argued, and the court
had held, that it was a state agency in a 1952 case and (2)
the legislature had recognized that the fees were public
moneys because it included the continuing appropriation of
the fees to the NDSA; therefore, the court held that the fees
were public moneys and had to be first paid to the state
treasury. Finally, the NDSA argued that the branding
program was preempted by the federal Packers and
Stockyards Act. The court held that the federal act did not
preempt the state program because the state program did
n t int rfere with the federal laws. Billey v. North Dakota
Stockmen’s Ass’n, 579 N.W.2d 171 (N.D. 1998).
STATE TAXATION
VALUATION OF LAND. The defendant’s county
assessor in 1997 made a county-wide reassessment of all
property. The assessor hired a soil expert to map the soils in
the county and based the assessment of the plaintiff’s farm
land on the soil type and comparable sales of other farms
with the same soil type. The new assessment did not
consider land features which limited or prohibited
production, such as gravel pits, potholes, streams, drains or
drainage problems. The plaintiff provided expert testimony
as to the effect of these land features on land value. The
evidence also showed that the defendant had known from
past litigation that the plaintiff’s property had many special
features. The court held that the plaintiff had met the
burden of proof that the valuation by the assessor was
incorrect and did not reflect the true and full value of the
property. Kocer v. Bon Homme County Comm’rs, 604
N.W.2d 1 (S.D. 1999).
WATER RIGHTS
INJUNCTION. The parties were neighbors and for
several years the plaintiff had access to two ponds located
on the defendant’s land. The plaintiff installed a pipe to use
the water in the ponds and the defendants cut off and
capped the pipe because they claimed that the plaintiff used
too much water and completely drained the ponds. The
plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction which was denied
by th  trial court because the plaintiff failed to show any
irreparable damages from the water cutoff. The appellate
court reversed, holding that irreparable harm could include
loss of business and goodwill and that the plaintiff should
have the opportunity to present evidence that may indicate
lasting damage to crop production. Hunsaker v. Kersh,
991 P.2d 67 (Utah 1999).
CITATION UPDATES
C. Bean Lumber Transport, Inc. v. United States, 68
F. Supp.2d 1055 (W.D. Ark. 1999) (like-kind exchange)
s e 10 Agric. L. Dig. 78 (1999).
Davis v. United States, 71 F. Supp.3d 623 (W.D. Tex.
1999) (interest) see 10 Agric. L. Dig. 134 (1999).
Estate of Smith v. Comm’r, 198 F.3d 516 (5th Cir.
1999) (claims against estate) see p. 4 supra.
Gr at Rivers Coop. of Southeastern Iowa v. Farmland
Indu ries, Inc., 198 F.3d 685 (8th Cir. 1999), aff’g unrep.
D. Ct. dec. (S.D. Iowa 1997) (cooperative securities) see p.
3 supra.
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The Agricultural Law Press announces two new annual seminars
SEMINAR IN THE OZARKS
&
SEMINAR IN NEW MEXICO
  AGRICULTURAL TAX AND LAW SEMINARS
by Neil E. Harl and Roger A. McEowen
May 31, June 1-3, 2000 Tan-Tar-A Resort, Lake of the Ozarks
August 16-19, 2000 Inn of the Mountain Gods, Mescalero, NM
Come join us for a world-class seminar on the hottest topics in agricultural tax and law. Space is limited for these wonderful
opportunities to gain expert insight into agricultural law and enjoy the many activities offered by both of these splendid resorts.
The first seminar will be Wednesday, Thursday, Friday and Saturday, May 31, June 1-3, 2000 at the Tan-Tar-A Resort & Spa
located on the Lake of the Ozarks located in the heart of the Missouri Ozarks. The second seminar will be Wednesday, Thursday,
Friday and Saturday, August 16-19, 2000 at the Inn of the Mountain Gods resort in the south central mountains of New Mexico.
Registrants may attend one, two, three or all four days, with separate pricing for each combination. On Wednesday, Dr. Harl will
speak about farm and ranch income tax. On Thursday, Dr. Harl will cover farm and ranch estate tax. On Friday, Roger McEowen
will cover farm and ranch business planning. On Saturday, Roger McEowen will cover current developments in several other areas
of agricultural law. Your registration fee includes a copy of Dr. Neil Harl's seminar manuals, Farm Income Tax (almost 300 pages)
and Farm Estate and Business Planning: Annotated Materials  (nea ly 500 pages) and a copy of Roger McEowen’s outline, all of
which will be updated just prior to the seminar. The seminar materials will also be available on CD-ROM for a small additional
charge. Continental buffet breakfasts and break refreshments are also included in the registration fee.
Here are some of the major topics to be covered:
• Taxation of debt, taxation of bankruptcy, the latest on SE tax of rental of land to a family-owned entity; income averaging; earned
income credit; commodity futures transactions; paying wages in kind.
• Federal estate tax, including 15-year installment payment of federal estate tax, co-ownership discounts, alternate valuation date,
special use valuation, family-owned business deduction (FOBD), handling life insurance, marital deduction planning, disclaimers,
planning to minimize tax over deaths of both spouses, and generation skipping transfer tax.
• Gifts and federal gift tax, including problems with future interests, handling estate freezes, and “hidden” gifts.
• Income tax aspects of property transfer, including income in respect of decedent, installment sales, private annuities, self-
canceling installment notes, and part gift/part sale transactions.
• Organizing the farm business--one entity or two, corporations, general and limited partnerships and limited liability companies.
• Legal developments in farm contracts, secured transactions, bankruptcy, real property, water law, torts, and environmental law.
Special room discounts are available at both resorts. The resorts feature a variety of splendid guest accommodations and activities,
including horseback riding, golf, sailing, hiking, tennis, fishing, and swimming.
The seminar registration fees  for current subscribers    to the Agricultural Law Digest, the Agricultural Law Manual, or Principles of
Agricultural Law are $175 (one day), $340 (two days), $490 (three days), and $620 (four days).  The registration fees for
nonsubscribers    are $195, $380, $550 and $700 respectively. The registration fees are higher for registrations within 30 days prior to
the seminar. A registration form is available online at www.agrilawpress.com
For more information, call/fax Robert Achenbach at 1-541-302-1958, or e-mail at robert@agr awpress.com
